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Central American politicians are concerned about the recent military buildup in the region the most
rapid in its history. One of the most senior and experienced officials in the Honduran government
told NEW YORK TIMES correspondent James LeMoyne (NEW YORK TIMES, 04/19/87), "There
is always the implicit threat that the army will overthrow you some day...They don't overthrow us
because it's not in their interest right now and because the US has told them not to. But what the
US is basically doing here is paying our army not to have a coup. Who knows what will happen
when you are no longer here to stop them?" US military assistance to allies in the region jumped
from $14.2 million in 1981 to $212 million in 1986, and the security forces in El Salvador, Honduras,
and Guatemala have more than doubled since 1981. Strong misgivings about the military buildup
were repeatedly expressed in interviews during the last month with Honduran, Salvadoran and
Guatemalan political leaders, who said the armies in their countries had never been more politically
sophisticated or stronger than they are today. "The army is essentially a separate political party
the institutional party," a Salvadoran political analyst said. "All other sectors businessmen, the
government, the opposition parties and the American Embassy go to the army to bargain and work
out deals." A Guatemalan political leader said, "The army is not subordinate to civil authority, it
is parallel to it. Civilians go to the army with their hats in their hands." A senior Western diplomat
in San Salvador stated that "the biggest long-term threat to civilian government in El Salvador is
the army, not the guerrillas." The military buildup, along with the election of civilian governments
has been strongly supported by the Reagan administration. When asked to explain the rationale
behind US military aid, a senior US military adviser said, "You can call it buying influence if you
like, but what it is, is common sense...When you get down to it, we are here to protect American
national interests and we have to rely on local armies to help us do that." The Salvadoran security
forces, including police and army, rose from 16,850 men in 1981 to more than 57,000 in 1986. Similar
though less rapid growth has occurred in Honduras and Guatemala. In Honduras the constant
military maneuvers have been used to create a sprawling, modern air base at Palmerola that
houses more than 1,000 American servicemen, as well as to build or improve at least seven other
airstrips. Washington has sent hundreds of advisers and CIA operatives to supervise the training
and management of the armies and police forces of its allies in the region. Special visas are arranged
for trips to the US by women who are companions of military officers, play host to parties for key
commanders and bring them gifts to reward friendship. Critics charge that US policy has been
largely responsible for the creation or strengthening of the armies in Guatemala, Nicaragua and
El Salvador, which became the most repressive and corrupt in Latin America. The Salvadoran
army has never acknowledged that killing civilians is wrong, and several officers involved in well
documented killings are still on active duty. "What we did was legitimate self-defense in the face of
communist total war," said an army intelligence officer at the crack Arce battalion, which has been
trained by the CIA. "The dirty war in Argentina was also necessary. We are talking about total war
against communists." The Reagan administration has continued the traditional practice of funneling
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military aid directly to local armies and police, with almost no influence from civilian officials.
According to accounts by US officials in Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica, the chief arbiter of
whether the army in Honduras or El Salvador gets aid is not the civilian cabinet or head of state, but
rather the US ambassador and the head of the army, who "consult" with civilian officials. LeMoyne
pointed out that one US envoy who insisted that army commanders make their request through the
civilian government, John Ferch in Honduras, antagonized the Honduran military high command
and reportedly was one of the factors that moved Elliott Abrams to win approval for his summary
dismissal last year. Diplomats say the Honduran army also receives hefty assistance as payment for
tolerating the presence of the contras. When Sandinista units attacked contra bases in Honduras
last year, Honduras was given $20 million in "emergency" military aid. Reagan said the Honduran
government initiated the request, while Ferch said he had been ordered by the State Department
to tell the president to ask for aid. Summary of the Military Buildup in Central America* Purchases
Security Forces Costa Rica 1981 None 5,000 1986 $6 million 9,500 El Salvador 1981 $10 million 16,850
1986 $122 million 57,640 Guatemala 1981 $4,000 18,050 1986 $5.1 million 43,600 Honduras 1981 $4.2
million 14,200 1986 $79.4 million 24,200 Panama 1981 $0.4 million 11,000 1986 $3.6 million 12,000
Nicaragua 1981 None 14,700 1986 None 129,000 *Total dollar values of military articles and services
purchased from the US with cash, credit, grants or aid, except in Nicaragua. The US is virtually the
sole foreign source of military goods and services for its five client regimes. Purchases are for fiscal
years. Forces include army, navy, air force and police and other paramilitary units under military
command. Sources: Defense Department (cost) and International Institute for Strategic Studies
(forces).
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